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The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and currently directed by Professor 
Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing 
the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global 
politics. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, projects 
and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is 
organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of 
European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s 
neighbourhood and the wider world. 
For more information: http://eui.eu/rscas 
The Policy Paper Series of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies complements its Working 
Papers Series. This series aims to disseminate the views of a person or a group on a particular policy 
matter, specifically in the field of European integration. 
The European University Institute and the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies are not 
responsible for the proposals and opinions expressed by the author(s). 
The aim of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies is to contribute to the public debate by 
offering views and opinions on matters of general interest. 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). 
European Parliament elections in May 2019 come at a critical time in the evolution of the EU 
as these will be the first elections after the expected departure of the UK (March 2019) and at 
a time when divergence on many issues characterises member state relations. Wider global 
developments weigh heavily on Europe with the return of hard geopolitics and efforts to 
undermine the global multilateral order. The European University Institute (EUI) wants to 
highlight the major issues that are at the heart of the political agenda at this juncture as a 
contribution to the debate. The papers are part of a wider programme on the elections 
including the development of a Voting Advice Application (VAA), euandi2019, and an 
online tool specifically tailored for mobile EU citizens voting either in their country of 
citizenship or residence, spaceu2019.
This initiative on the European Parliament elections in 2019 is part of the Schuman Centre’s 
European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP) egpp.eui.eu. Launched in 2018, the 
Programme aims to foster high-quality academic research and reflection on the European 
Union and European integration with a medium to long-term perspective. The EGPP also 
promotes engagement on contemporary issues through various events, including blog 
debates and thematic conferences and workshops.
  
Abstract 
Four years after the effective collapse of the EU’s common asylum system, member states remain deeply 
divided about how to reform and rebuild Europe’s asylum, refugee and migration policies. Although the 
number of new asylum applications in the EU has declined sharply over the past two years – from 1.2 
million in both 2015 and 2016 to 0.6 million in 2017 and 0.46 million in 2018 (Jan-Sep) – asylum and 
immigration have remained highly salient and controversial issues in the domestic politics of many EU 
member states. There has also been a marked and much publicised increase in support for anti-
immigration parties. While, as we show, it would be mistaken to assume that a rising tide of anti-
immigration sentiment is sweeping across Europe, it is entirely plausible to imagine that the probable 
low turnout at the 2019 European Parliament election could bring a cohort of MEPs to Brussels and 
Strasbourg keen to take an even tougher line on asylum, refugees and migration. Indeed, the idea that 
EP elections would one day become transnational contexts in which issues of pan-European concern 
were discussed and debated might be realised. However, it was probably not expected that immigration 
would be the issue, and neither that the parties most keen to debate on this issue would often link their 
opposition to immigration with a degree of Euroscepticism.  
EU debates about common asylum and migration policy reforms have been highly acrimonious and 
deeply divisive, with little apparent consensus on anything other than the lowest common denominator 
of a need for greater border control. Some member states see the solution to the immigration challenge 
as lying in ‘more Europe’ (e.g. through a centralisation of the EU asylum system) and ‘greater solidarity’ 
between member states (e.g. through a redistribution of refugees across countries), whereas others 
appear to have given up waiting for EU policy reform and instead have pursued national or trans-national 
policy responses, involving just a few ‘like-minded’ EU member states (e.g. the joint measures by 
Austria and nine Balkan states in 2016 to help ‘close down’ the ‘western Balkan route,’ and proposals 
by Austria and Denmark to severely limit the right to apply for asylum in Europe). This has further 
deepened divisions and raised profound questions, not only about the meaning of ‘solidarity’ in Europe 
but also about the future of the EU and its ability to find common ground on a fundamental and, some 
would argue, existential policy challenge.  
Given the disagreements among EU member states about the large number of proposals that have been 
made over the past few years, we argue that the first step toward facilitating reform is not another ‘better’ 
proposal, but discussion and agreement on the basic principles behind the EU’s common asylum and 
migration policies. If countries do not agree on the basic principles underlying and guiding policy 
reform, there can be no hope of finding effective and sustainable common policies. We suggest that the 
principles behind EU asylum, refugee and migration policies need to speak to three fundamental issues: 
(i) a better understanding of public attitudes; (ii) greater realism; and (iii) more clarity about the 
fundamental values guiding policy reform. 
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Context: From ‘greater solidarity’ to ‘the end of asylum’ in Europe 
While there has been little agreement on how to rebuild Europe’s common policies on asylum and 
migration since the de-facto collapse of the Dublin system in 2015, there has been no shortage of policy 
proposals. EU member states have suggested a range of new and diverse asylum and refugee policy 
models that offer contrasting ideas about: the meaning and scope of the right to asylum in Europe; the 
resettlement of refugees from conflict regions; minimum standards of protection; assistance to and 
cooperation with origin and transit countries; and responsibility-sharing across EU member states. 
‘Increased and more effective border control’ has been one of the few common themes and points of 
agreement, as was reflected in a recent EU Council decision to expand ‘Frontex,’ the EU’s border 
agency, by 10,000 operational staff by 2020.  
Some member states have gone further and argued that there is a need to rethink the right to asylum 
in Europe, which they see as a major pull factor for migrants who have left their home countries for 
economic reasons rather than to seek protection from persecution. In an October 2018 joint ‘Vision 
Paper,’ Austria and Denmark proposed that asylum in Europe should only be granted if the asylum 
seeker is from a country neighbouring the EU or if there is no other ‘safe haven’ that is closer to the 
asylum seeker’s country of origin. While many European countries have long pursued policies aimed at 
minimising the number of asylum seekers reaching their territories, the recent Austrian-Danish proposal 
stands out for its explicit suggestion to drastically limit the right to asylum and protection in Europe. 
The Austrian Minister of the Interior has also suggested that in the medium to long term the right to 
asylum in Europe could be eliminated altogether.  
Proposals for new asylum and refugee policies have also included a range of different measures 
aimed at stronger cooperation with transit countries, especially in northern Africa, in order to prevent 
migrants from embarking on journeys across the sea to Europe and, more generally, to reduce the 
number of asylum seekers in EU member states. For example, in June 2018 the EU Council 
recommended the creation of ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ where migrants rescued in the 
Mediterranean would be taken for processing. It is clear that different member states have varying views 
about the precise purpose of and legal framework for such platforms. While some countries see them as 
asylum processing centres from which people may be able to apply for protection in Europe, others have 
explicitly ruled out this option/function, arguing that the prospect of obtaining the right to protection in 
Europe would create yet another pull factor.  
Proposals aimed at keeping asylum seekers away from Europe have also included ones for measures 
to radically increase Europe’s financial and economic assistance to transit countries, countries of first 
asylum and, where possible, migrants’ countries of origin. The hope is that increased aid and 
cooperation, especially with African countries, would reduce migration pressures in Europe. 
A third area of policy reform highlighted in some proposals emphasises a need for greater solidarity 
and better asylum policies in Europe. One of the European Commission’s first responses to the rapid 
increase in asylum seekers coming to Europe in 2015 was to call for greater responsibility-sharing across 
EU member states, specifically in the form of an EU-wide mechanism that would re-distribute and 
allocate refugees across member states using an agreed distribution key based mainly on the size of 
countries’ populations and economies (GDP). Although the relocation policy and mechanism were 
agreed in 2016, very few EU countries have accepted their allocated share of refugees, with some openly 
opposing the policy, so that the policy quickly ended in failure. Other policy measures have aimed at 
building a more centralised asylum system in Europe.  
This wide range of policy proposals reflects the deep divisions among EU member states on how to 
fix Europe’s broken common policies on asylum and refugee protection. It is easy to argue that, and 
explain why, the EU must not fail in its efforts to come up with more effective common policies on 
asylum and refugee protection, but, given the failure of the past few years, how could this be achieved? 
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We argue that what is needed most at this stage is not another ‘better’ proposal but discussion and 
agreement on fundamental policy principles that should drive policy reform.  
Policy principles 
Understanding attitudes 
To move forward with policy that can command the necessary public support, there is an a priori need 
to understand more about the drivers and structure of attitudes to migration in Europe. Perhaps 
surprisingly given the heated rhetoric, survey evidence shows there is not a wave of anti-immigration 
sentiment sweeping across Europe, although political leaders sometimes seem to behave as though there 
is. There are some important variations between countries, but Figure 1 shows that even during the 
‘migration crisis’ after 2015 attitudes to migrants both from outside the EU and within the EU became 
more, not less, favourable.  
Figure 1: Negative attitudes to EU and non‐EU immigrants in the EU‐28 and selected western 
EU member states, 2014–2018 
 
Source: Dennison and Geddes (2018) 
Eurobarometer. ‘Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for 
you? Immigration of people from other EU Member States/Immigration of people from outside the EU.’ Percentages 
responding ‘fairly negative’ or ‘very negative.’ 
If Europeans are not turning against immigration, then why do we see increased support for anti-
immigration political parties in many EU member states? Research shows that migration is a highly 
salient political issue in many EU member states and that salience correlates with support for anti-
immigration political parties. Europeans are not turning against immigration; instead, high levels of 
issue salience amongst a significant – albeit shrinking – section of the European population play a 
powerful role in driving support for anti-immigration political parties.  
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A decline in negativity should not be understood as necessarily meaning greater receptiveness to 
policies that are more progressive in terms of migrants entering the territory of an EU member state 
and/or access to rights once admitted. There is extensive social research evidence showing that many 
European citizens have conservative value orientations that lead them to favour security, tradition and 
conformity. Arguments for more progressive policies that project onto such people other – often more 
audibly celebrated in EU discourse – universal values are unlikely to resonate. Moreover, while people 
with conservative value orientations may well not be opposed to immigration and do sympathise with 
the plight of refugees, they are like to have found the chaos, disorder and discord that accompanied the 
so-called migration crisis disturbing.  
Evidence-based realism  
Our second basic principle – evidence-based realism – seeks a better-informed understanding of what 
individual member states, and the EU as a whole, can and cannot realistically do to ‘control’ migration 
and achieve certain policy objectives, and over what time frame. Maintaining and projecting state control 
over the scale and characteristics of immigration is important for support for, and trust in, government. 
A damaging aspect of the failure of European countries to deal more effectively with migration flows 
to Europe in recent years has been a perception that “immigration is out of control” and a consequent 
decline in public trust in national governments and EU institutions (McLaren, 2016). What are highly 
problematic, however, are populist proposals and arguments for unrealistic ‘unicorn’ solutions that are 
simply not available, at least not in the short to medium term. While it is important to critically reflect 
on what constitutes basic reality and binding constraints on government policies and policy-making, it 
is not difficult to find examples of recent policy proposals that promise break-through ‘solutions’ 
through radical paradigm shifts that involve patently unrealistic policies.  
For example, the idea of external processing centres, especially, but not only, in Africa, has re-
emerged as a key aspect of policy reform proposed by various European governments. Since the idea 
was first floated in the early 2000s, no country in the EU neighbourhood has ever been found to host 
such a centre. It is, therefore, not surprising that just a few months after the EU Council encouraged the 
European Commission in June 2018 to find countries that would host regional disembarkation platforms, 
Commission President Juncker declared that the idea was no longer on the European agenda, largely 
because no willing African partner country could be found. Even if a country could one day be convinced 
to host such platforms/centres, one can think of many important practical questions about, for example, 
what would happen if such centres filled up with migrants who could not be moved elsewhere, and how 
the EU would control the conditions in such centres, etc.  
Another more general example of an unrealistic policy approach is many European countries’ 
insistence on an ‘enforcement first, legal admissions later’ approach to policy reform, i.e. the idea that 
we need to first reduce irregular migration and only afterwards enhance the resettlement of refugees 
directly from first countries of asylum or nearby conflict regions. There is an obvious political danger 
that the policy would deliver step 1 (enforcement) but not step 2 (more legal admissions). More effective 
efforts to regulate migration will also require greater co-operation with countries of origin and transit. 
Incentivizing (or ‘buying’) this support by providing more economic assistance is, on its own, unlikely 
to be enough. International migration is a domestic policy challenge in all countries, not just in Europe. 
To engage in effective and sustainable partnerships with African countries, Europe will have to make a 
‘legal migration offer’ in the form of an increase in the resettlement of recognised refugees and, 
depending on the country, also more legal labour migration opportunities. An effective and realistic new 
system for asylum and migration in the EU requires a comprehensive approach that delivers more border 
enforcement, more help for countries of origin and more legal migration pathways at the same time, not 
sequentially as countries like Austria and Denmark have recently proposed.  
A final example of an unrealistic suggestion is the idea that economic assistance and job creation in 
first countries of asylum will necessarily lead to a massive reduction in emigration pressures from these 
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countries. While economic assistance and labour market integration in first countries of asylum will 
undoubtedly reduce the number of migrants seeking access to Europe’s labour markets, it is unrealistic 
to think that this policy will, on its own, lead to a large decline in migration flows to Europe. Research 
has shown that recent policy initiatives aimed at creating jobs for refugees in first countries of asylum – 
such as special economic zones in Jordan – can be hampered by political considerations in the host 
countries that are not dissimilar to those motivating European countries to encourage solutions in or near 
conflict regions rather than in Europe.  
Clarifying values 
A critical third principle is clarity about the fundamental values underlying and guiding policy reform. 
Values are needed to provide pragmatic policy responses with boundaries (or ‘red lines’). While it may 
be necessary and desirable to debate and potentially change the norms and values underlying current 
policy approaches (i.e. those associated with the Geneva Convention and relevant European asylum laws 
and policies), a fundamental problem with some of the recent proposals has been what appears to be an 
absence of recognisable ‘red lines.’ 
For example, the Austrian-Danish proposal envisages limiting the right to asylum in Europe on the 
basis of the argument that European countries’ current asylum policies centred on the Geneva 
Convention are no longer suited to addressing the asylum and protection challenges of the 21st century. 
The core idea is to shift the policy focus away from assisting migrants who have the resources and are 
physically strong enough to migrate and apply for asylum in Europe to providing more effective 
protection to ‘the most vulnerable migrants’ in countries of first reception near conflict areas. This is to 
be done primarily through more economic assistance for regions of origin and stricter enforcement of 
the external EU border, partly through the establishment of ‘disembarkation platforms’ in Africa where 
migrants rescued in the Mediterranean would be taken and from where it would not be possible to apply 
for protection in Europe. If implemented, these new policies would clearly violate current norms about 
the right to apply for asylum and non-refoulement. While it is important to debate new ideas such as 
those in the Austrian-Danish vision statement, we also need more much more clarity – and honesty – 
about the ethical implications and issues at stake. What are the new (or modified) ‘European values’ 
that guide and constitute the new ‘red lines’ of the EU’s asylum and refugee policies? What are the 
normative limits that circumscribe and constrain pragmatic new policies toward asylum seekers, 
refugees and other migrants?  
Similar questions can and should be asked about cooperation between the EU (and some of its 
member states) and transit countries outside the EU. A central plank of EU efforts to reduce irregular 
migration to Europe has been to support transit countries, e.g. in northern Africa, to help prevent 
departures, which often involve dangerous boat journeys across the Mediterranean, to Europe. There is 
considerable evidence to show that some of the policies and measures implemented by transit countries 
and supported and financed by the EU have involved grave violations of migrants’ fundamental rights 
and security. As the EU and many of its member states are rapidly increasing their financial assistance 
and support to African countries, it is important to ask how much control Europe retains over how 
exactly these resources are used, and to what extent the migration control measures implemented by 
non-EU countries as part of cooperation agreements with the EU are in line with the fundamental values 
of European countries.  
To be clear, our primary concern here is not with legal issues, e.g. whether or not a particular new 
policy proposal is compliant with current EU and international laws and norms, but with moral and 
normative issues that underpin both the overall approach and specific new measures in new policy 
proposals. One of the fundamental challenges for any asylum and refugee policy is how to deal with the 
common tension between providing asylum and protection for refugees on the one hand and maintaining 
the integrity of general immigration controls on the other. Clarity and honesty about fundamental values 
and normative ‘red lines’ are needed to debate and respond to this tension systematically and effectively.  
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Conclusion 
How to rebuild its common policies on asylum and refugee protection in an effective and sustainable 
manner is a defining question for the European Union. This is a fundamental test of the EU’s ability to 
respond to rapid socio-economic changes and to facilitate common policy responses that add value to 
national policies. Given that the EU member states have disagreed on virtually all of the recent new 
policy proposals made by member states and the EU institutions over the past four years, we have argued 
that the most productive way forward is not to discuss another ‘better’ policy package but to focus on 
the fundamental principles that are meant to guide and drive reform. We have suggested three 
fundamental questions and principles that relate to: (i) understanding public attitudes; (ii) the degree of 
realism in policy proposals and responses; and (iii) the fundamental values that underpin and constrain 
new policies. Without agreement on these fundamental policy principles there is little hope that the 
European Union will be able to break the current deadlock over the future of its common policies on 
asylum and immigration.  
References  
Austrian Ministry of the Interior and Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration (Oct 2018) “Vision 
for a Better Protection System in a Globalized World,” available at http://uim.dk/filer/nyheder-
2018/vision-for-a-better-protection-system-in-a-globalized-world.pdf  
Dennison, J. and A. Geddes (2018) “A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti‐
Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe,” The Political Quarterly, Early View, 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12620  
McLaren, L. (2016) Cause for Concern: The Implications of Immigration for Political Trust, London: 
Policy Network, http://www.policy-network.net/publications/3889/Cause-for-concern?-The-
impact-of-immigration-on-political-trust 
Ruhs, M. and M. Barslund (Oct 2018) “Reforming Europe’s refugee policies: The Austrian-Danish plan 
will not work,” Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2018/10/11/reforming-europe-s-refugee-
policies-austrian-danish-plan-will-not-work-view  
 
